by Matthew Murphy
Nicolas Carr stunned the business world in 2003 with his bold and counterintuitive assertion that IT doesn’t matter, unambiguously proclaimed as the title of the Harvard Business Review article that brought him to prominence. Carr’s thesis, simply put, is that information technology no longer offers firms a competitive advantage and that its value as a strategic concentration is diminishing. Coming soon after the bursting of the dot.com bubble, and apparently cementing a disillusionment with the promise of high tech wizardry, his article infuriated many in the IT field, including the CEO’s of technology companies such as Microsoft, HP and Intel.
Nicolas Carr stunned the business world in 2003 with his bold and counterintuitive assertion that IT doesn’t matter, unambiguously proclaimed as the title of the Harvard Business Review article that brought him to prominence. Carr’s thesis, simply put, is that information technology no longer offers firms a competitive advantage and that its value as a strategic concentration is diminishing. Coming soon after the bursting of the dot.com bubble, and apparently cementing a disillusionment with the promise of high tech wizardry, his article infuriated many in the IT field, including the CEO’s of technology companies such as Microsoft, HP and Intel.
Carr begins by pointing at both corporate spending patterns
and managerial attitudes toward IT, noting that businesses worldwide spend
“well over $2 trillion a year” in IT capital investment and that CEO’s
“routinely talk about the strategic value of IT.” Yet, Carr argues that this is a misplaced
priority dependent on a mistaken assumption, that IT’s predominance ensures its
strategic value. According to Carr,
“What makes a resource truly strategic is not its ubiquity – but its scarcity.” By taking a broad view of technological
development Carr is able to draw parallels between the current massive buildup
in IT capacity and earlier transformational technologies, like electrification
and rail transport. While initially the
adoption of these technologies offered individual firms a strategic advantage,
as they became more widespread and commoditized, they offered less in the way
of competitive advantages. Carr makes a
distinction between what he calls proprietary and infrastructural technologies. Proprietary are those that are owned
exclusively by a particular firm, analogous to a firm’s specific business model
or patented products. Counterpoised to
this are the infrastructural technologies, like electricity and railroads that
offer scalable, networked platforms that attain greater value they more people
adopt them. Carr contends that IT is
becoming more like a standardized commodity, that it is in effect an
infrastructural technology, not a proprietary one.
To summarize, in Carr’s own words;
"Information technology is best understood as the
latest in a series of broadly adopted technologies that have reshaped industry
over the past two centuries - from the railroad to the telegraph to the
electric generator. For a brief period, as they were being built into the
infrastructure of commerce, all these technologies opened opportunities for
forward-looking companies to gain real advantages. But as their availability
increased and their cost decreased - as they became ubiquitous - they all
became commodity inputs. From a strategic standpoint, they became invisible;
they no longer mattered. That is exactly what is happening to information
technology today, and the implications for corporate IT management are
profound."
Writing in the Harvard Business Review, the publication of
the flagship management institution, Carr’s audience was unmistakable; he was
speaking directly to the CEO’s and managers of Corporate America. Perhaps he
forgot that many of America’s largest and most successful companies were, and
still are, technology companies; Microsoft, Intel, IBM, Hewlett Packard, Dell,
Cisco, Google and Apple. Still his
message was clear. Corporate America has
to manage itself differently, with much less emphasis on expensive IT
acquisition and development. Carr
offered some startling “new rules for IT management” which he summarized into
three simple bullet points: Spend
less. Follow, don’t lead. Focus on vulnerabilities, not opportunities. These clearly went against the conventional
wisdom of the day, and yet Carr argued that they were supported by the
historical evidence.
The biggest threat to a firms continuing competitive
position was overspending on IT projects that failed to deliver the expected
returns or make lasting contributions to a firm’s strategic position. He pointed to studies which showed that “greater
[IT] expenditures rarely translate into superior financial results” and that
going forward wasteful spending would be penalized with falling profits. The added expense would put those firms at a
“cost disadvantage.” He suggested that firms were wasteful in
their use of the existing investments, such as storage or processing capacity
and that stringently managing resources was better than trying to get the
latest, fastest and best hardware and software.
He supported this assertion by referring to Moore’s Law, (the law
proposed by Gordon Moore of Intel, which states that IT capability doubles
approximately every 18 months). This
trend has held for approximately 40 years and implies that delaying purchases
of new IT will reduce costs and avoid the inevitable obsolescence that
accompanies new products. Lastly, Carr
noted that “an IT disruption can paralyze a company’s ability to make products,
deliver its services, and connect with its customers” and therefore managers
should be much more focused on the vulnerabilities of their IT investments,
(“the technical glitches, outages, and security breaches”) than with bold new
opportunities. In short, “IT management
should, frankly, become boring.”
Given the importance of Carr’s analysis and the radical nature
of its implications, one has to ask does he make a convincing case or not? Carly Fiorina, CEO of HP called him “dead
wrong.” Bill Gates of Microsoft assailed
him in a speech in Redmond and a Microsoft official was quoted as saying “It's
just silly to think that there's no competitive advantage to be made in IT.
It's insanity.” Despite a flurry of responses, Carr himself noted that
his article “just won’t stay debunked.”
One notable adversary was Don Tapscott, who penned an article called
“IT: The Engine That Drives Success” at CIO.com, in which he offered a point by
point critique of Carr's article and raised specific objections to his thesis. Tapscott identifies three factors related to
information technology that are critical for a firm’s competitive advantage;
superior information, smart hardware and business model transformation.
The first factor he called "superior
information." In responding to
Carr's criticism of information technology, Tapscott takes issue with Carr's
definition of IT itself. While Carr
initially includes data and information in his definition, he then extrapolates
that data is simply a commodity, "endlessly and perfectly reproducible at
virtually no cost." Tapscott takes
issue with this, noting that "nothing in this universe is as diverse as a
byte of data, which can carry information ranging from baby pictures to a
digitally signed million-dollar bank transfer. It’s like saying that
Shakespeare’s works are a commodity because he uses the alphabet just like
everybody else." He differentiates
between the medium and the message, from the content and its delivery
mechanism. He points out that not only
is data not perfectly commoditized but rather that "nothing is more scarce
that the right information at the right time." Carr suggested that data itself was not a
source of competitive advantage, but Tapscott was quick to point out that superior
use of data is. KFC's recipe or
Coca-Cola’s secret formula or Google’s PageRank algorithm are examples of a
non-commoditized piece of information giving a firm a competitive advantage
that is not duplicable through the use of information technology. Tapscott's assertion about the importance of
superior information in driving competitive advantage can be summed up as
follows:
"Superior IT enables superior
information a resource that rivals superior talent in competitive
differentiation. High-performing business models are also based on superior
information."
The second factor is what Tapscott calls "smart
hardware," or "the growing technology embedded in consumer
products." Tapscott notes that
"the physical world is becoming smart and networked" through
"ubiquitous broadband and services-based computing." Some have referred to this trend, which began
with the use of RFID chips to manage supply chains, and extends to sensors in
everything from "automobiles, [to] doors, clothing and coffee cups"
as "the internet of things."
By taking advantage of this "historic opportunity to integrate
IT-enabled services into its products," a company can
"differentiat[e] otherwise commodity products to lock out
competitors." Carr took technology
to be ubiquitous and standardized, but Tapscott pointed at smart hardware as a
direct refutation of the generalizations that Carr was making and suggested that
our concept of what IT is (ie. hardware) is changing rapidly.
Perhaps the most important determinant of corporate
competitive advantage that Tapscott identifies is "the role of IT in the
new business designs that enable competitive advantage." While Carr accepts that "effective
business models can be the basis for competitiveness," he rejects
"the role IT plays in creating these new models." Tapscott calls this into question, saying,
"IT and business models are not discrete factors in strategy; increasingly,
they are inseparable." This is what
Valacich and Schneider refer to as "technology/strategy fit." Pearlson and Saunders regard it as one leg of
the Information Systems Strategy Triangle.
Luftman and Kempaiah call it "business/IT alignment." This fit or alignment is the principal
concern of business process management.
While business strategy should drive IT strategy, increasingly "IT
is leading to profound changes in business design not just to new business
processes but to the deep structures of the corporation." This is the essential driver of a company's
competitive advantage, "focusing on their core cluster of activities where
they have unique capabilities and where they create true barriers to
replication." The companies that do
so "tend to have better products, lower cost structures and better
profitability than their vertically integrated counterparts." By using this IT-enabled business process
change, a company creates a challenge for its competitors, to duplicate the
business model change not just the technology.
Tapscott concludes that "companies that successfully alter their
business around IT can achieve a significant window of competitive
advantage." (Luftmann and Kempaiah offer
a slight twist on this by saying that "organizations need to recognize
that it is not how IT is aligned with the
business; it is how IT and business are aligned
with each other.")
Carr’s writing has had a profound impact and led to a heated
debate that continues to this day. Carr
wrote a follow-up book a year later entitled “Does IT Matter?” Perhaps the
change in the title from a definitive statement to a question at least opens
the possibility that there is a debate to be had on the subject. In order to solidify his position, Carr would
have to nail down exactly what he means by the “fuzzy term” - information
technology and differentiate which parts of it he thinks are infrastructural
commodities and which parts are necessary to a firm’s competitive
advantage. In a footnote in the original
article, Carr states “Information technology is a fuzzy term. In this article, it is … denoting the
technologies used for processing, storing, and transporting information in
digital form.” It is not possible to
characterize IT by this definition alone.
He would also have to address Tapscott’s critiques about the uses of
superior information, smart hardware and IT-enabled business process change in
order to create a more compelling narrative.
Works Cited
Carr, N. (2003, May 1). “IT Doesn't Matter.” Harvard Business
Review. pp. 5-12.
Luftman, J. and Kempaiah, R. (September 2007). An Update on
Business-IT Alignment: ‘A Line’
Has Been Drawn. MIS Quarterly Executive (6:3).
Pearlson, K., & Saunders, C. (2009). Managing and Using
Information Systems: A Strategic
Approach. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. 97.
Tapscott, D. (2004, May 1). “IT: The Engine That Drives
Success.” CIO Magazine , pp. 1-6.
Valacich, J. & Schneider, C. (2012). Information Systems
Today, Managing in the Digital World. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice
Hall.
Some quotes obtained from Nicholas Carr’s blog, Rough Type
at http://www.roughtype.com
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